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“Laws of Nature” as an Indexical Term: A Reinterpretation of Lewis's Best-System Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

John Roberts
John Roberts*
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh
*
†Department of Philosophy, 1001 Cathedral of Learning, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260.
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Abstract

David Lewis's best-system analysis of laws of nature is perhaps the best known sophisticated regularity theory of laws. Its strengths are widely recognized, even by some of its ablest critics. Yet it suffers from what appears to be a glaring weakness: It seems to grant an arbitrary privilege to the standards of our own scientific culture. I argue that by reformulating, or reinterpreting, Lewis's exposition of the best-system analysis, we arrive at a view that is free of this weakness. The resulting theory of laws has the surprising consequence that the term “law of nature” is indexical.

Type
Causation and Laws of Nature
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 66 , Issue S3: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers Sep., 1999 , 1999 , pp. S502 - S511
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I am grateful to Joe Camp, John Earman, and John MacFarlane for helpful comments on earlier drafts.

References

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