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Laws and Statistical Mechanics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Eric Winsberg
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Abstract

This paper explores some connections between competing conceptions of scientific laws on the one hand, and a problem in the foundations of statistical mechanics on the other. I examine two proposals for understanding the time asymmetry of thermodynamic phenomenal: David Albert's recent proposal and a proposal that I outline based on Hans Reichenbach's “branch systems”. I sketch an argument against the former, and mount a defense of the latter by showing how to accommodate statistical mechanics to recent developments in the philosophy of scientific laws.

Type
Laws, Possibility, and the New Instrumentalism
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 71 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers , December 2004 , pp. 707 - 718
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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