Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gbm5v Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T01:04:22.509Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Kim on Deductive Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Charles G. Morgan*
Affiliation:
University of Alberta

Extract

In [2] Hempel and Oppenheim give a definition of “explanation” for a certain formal language. In [1] Eberle, Kaplan, and Montague prove five theorems demonstrating that the Hempel and Oppenheim definition is not restrictive enough. In [3] Kim proposes two further conditions to supplement the Hempel and Oppenheim definition in order to avoid the objections posed in [1]. In this paper it is shown that the definition of Hempel and Oppenheim supplemented by Kim's conditions is open to a trivialization very analogous to that given in [1].

Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © 1970 by The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

1

Work for this paper was completed while the author was a Graduate Trainee for the National Science Foundation.

References

REFERENCES

[1] Eberle, R., Kaplan, D., and Montague, R., “Hempel and Oppenheim on Explanation”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 28, 1961, pp. 418428.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[2] Hempel, C. G. and Oppenheim, P., “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 15, 1948, pp. 135175.10.1086/286983CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[3] Kim, J., “Discussion: On the Logical Conditions of Deductive Explanation,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 30, 1963, pp. 286291.10.1086/287943CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[4] Mendelson, E., Introduction to Mathematical Logic, New York, 1965, pp. 45101.Google Scholar