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Is the Contingentist/Inevitabilist Debate a Matter of Degrees?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Joseph D. Martin
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Abstract

The contingentist/inevitabilist debate contests whether the results of successful science are contingent or inevitable. This article addresses lingering ambiguity in the way contingency is defined in this debate. I argue that contingency in science can be understood as a collection of distinct concepts, distinguished by how they hold science contingent, by what elements of science they hold contingent, and by what those elements are contingent upon. I present a preliminary taxonomy designed to characterize the full-range positions available and illustrate that these constitute a diverse array rather than a spectrum.

Type
General Philosophy of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 80 , Issue 5 , December 2013 , pp. 919 - 930
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

The author thanks Ken Waters, Alan Love, Michel Janssen, and Margaret Charleroy, who all provided keen commentary on earlier versions of this article.

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