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Is Structural Realism Possible?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Stathis Psillos
Stathis Psillos*
Affiliation:
University of Athens
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy & History of Science, University of Athens, 37 John Kennedy Str., 16121, Athens, Greece; email: [email protected].
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Abstract

This paper examines in detail two paths that lead to Structural Realism (SR), viz. a substantive philosophical position which asserts that only the structure of the world is knowable. The upward path is any attempt to begin with empiricist premises and reach a sustainable realist position. (It has been advocated by Russell, Weyl, and Maxwell among others.) The downward path is any attempt to start from realist premises and construct a weaker realist position. (It has been recently advocated by Worrall, French, and Ladyman.) This paper unravels and criticizes the metaphysical presuppositions of both paths to SR. It questions its very possibility as a substantive—and viable—realist thesis.

Type
Metaphysics and Methodology of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 68 , Issue S3: No. 3 Supplement: Proceedings of the 2000 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers Sep., 2001 , 2001 , pp. S13 - S24
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 2001

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Footnotes

‡

Thanks to Theodore Arabatzis, Otavio Bueno, Peter Clark, Craig Callender, Chris Daly, Bill Demopoulos, Igor Douven, John Earman, Steven French, Carl Hoefer, Jeff Ketland, James Ladyman, John Norton, Peter Machamer, Thomas Uebel, and John Worrall for stimulating comments and discussions. Versions of this paper were presented at the annual BSPS conference in Sheffield and at the Center for the Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh.

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