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Infinity and the Past

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Quentin Smith
Quentin Smith*
Affiliation:
Marion, Indiana
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Abstract

Several contemporary philosophers, like G. J. Whitrow, argue that it is logically impossible for the past to be infinite, and offer several arguments in support of this thesis. I believe their arguments are unsuccessful and aim to refute six of them in the six sections of the paper. One of my main criticisms concerns their supposition that an infinite series of past events must contain some events separated from the present event by an infinite number of intermediate events, and consequently that from one of these infinitely distant past events the present could never have been reached. I introduce several considerations to show that an infinite series of past events need not contain any events separated from the present event by an infinite number of intermediate events.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 54 , Issue 1 , March 1987 , pp. 63 - 75
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I am grateful to William Vallicella and a reader for Philosophy of Science for their helpful criticisms of an earlier version of this paper.

References

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