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Inductive Logic and the Ravens Paradox

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Patrick Maher
Patrick Maher*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
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Abstract

Hempel's paradox of the ravens arises from the inconsistency of three prima facie plausible principles of confirmation. This paper uses Camapian inductive logic to (a) identify which of the principles is false, (b) give insight into why this principle is false, and (c) identify a true principle that is sufficiently similar to the false one that failure to distinguish the two might explain why the false principle is prima facie plausible. This solution to the paradox is compared with a variety of other responses and is shown to differ from all of them.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 66 , Issue 1 , March 1999 , pp. 50 - 70
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois, 105 Gregory Hall, 810 South Wright Street, Urbana, IL 61801.

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