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Indeterminism, Counterfactuals, and Causation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Richard Otte
Richard Otte*
Affiliation:
Cowell College University of California, Santa Cruz
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Abstract

In this paper I wish to argue that counterfactual analyses of causation are inadequate. I believe the counterfactuals that are involved in counterfactual analyses of causation are often false, and thus the theories do not provide an adequate account of causation. This is demonstrated by the presentation of a counterexample to the counterfactual analyses of causation. I then present a unified theory of causation that is based upon probability and counterfactuals. This theory accounts for both deterministic and indeterministic causation, and is not subject to many of the traditional problems facing theories of causation.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 54 , Issue 1 , March 1987 , pp. 45 - 62
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

An earlier version of part of this paper was read at the 1985 Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association. I would like to thank Davis Baird and Wesley C. Salmon for helpful comments on that paper, and an anonymous referee for comments on an earlier version of this paper. This research was supported in part by Faculty Research funds and funds granted by the Regents of the University of California.

References

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