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Indeterminism and Natural Selection
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2022
Extract
The historical origin and the experimental basis of the concept of physical determinism indicate that this basis was removed with the acceptance of the kinetic theory of matter, while its difficulties are increased by the admission that human nature, in its entirety, is a product of natural causation. An indeterministic view of causation has the advantages (a) of unifying the concept of natural law in different spheres of human experience and (b) of a greater generality, which precludes the acceptance of the special case of completely deterministic causation, so long as this is an unproved assumption. It is not inconsistent with the orderliness of the world, or with the fruitful pursuit of natural knowledge. It enriches rather than weakens the concept of of causation. It possesses definite advantages with respect to the one-sidedness of human memory, and to the phenomena of aiming and striving observable in man and other animals. Among biological theories it appears to be most completely in harmony with the theory of natural selection, which in its statistical nature resembles the second law of thermo-dynamics.
In an indeterministic world natural causation has a creative element, and science is interested in locating the original causes of effects of special interest, and not merely in pushing a chain of causation backwards ad infinitum. These contrasting tendencies are illustrated by a critique of the mutation theory, and by an attempt more closely to define the sense in which indeterministic causation should be thought of as creative.
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- Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1934
References
1 The social selection of human fertility. Herbert Spencer Lecture, 8 June 1932. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
2 It is necessary to emphasize this aspect of causation since so revered a leader as Max Planck has referred to physicists who adopt the statistical method as “setting aside the principle of causation” (‘Where is Science Going‘ p. 64). Clearly here the principle of determinism is intended. It would be more just to speak of the statistical formulation of physical laws as reinstating the principle of causation.
3 The Genctical Theory of Natural Selection. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1930.
4 The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1930.
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