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In Defense of Duhem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Francis Seaman
Francis Seaman*
Affiliation:
University of Idaho
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Abstract

Adolph Grünbaum has argued that Duhem's conventionalism is false for the case of Euclidean geometry ([6], [7], [8]). According to Duhem, any portion of a physical theory can be preserved from falsifiability by providing suitable modifications elsewhere in the theory. Grünbaum argues that physical theory is composed of two parts: A geometrical part H, and a physical part A. For his test case—Euclidean geometry—he contends that by a suitable specification of A, a falsification of H is possible; i.e., H can be rendered “accessible to experimental ascertainment in isolation from other physical regularities.”

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 32 , Issue 3 , July 1965 , pp. 287 - 294
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1965

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References

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