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In Defense of a Probabilistic Theory of Causality
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Extract
Germund Hesslow has argued recently [2] that a probabilistic theory of causality as advocated by Patrick Suppes [4] has two problems that a deterministic theory avoids. In this paper, I argue that Suppes' probabilistic causal calculus is free of each of these problems and, moreover, that several broader issues raised by Hesslow's discussion tend to support a probabilistic conception of causes.
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- Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1978
Footnotes
I am grateful to the National Endowment for the Humanities for providing me two invaluable opportunities for intensive study: at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford in the summer of 1975 and at Yale as a fellow in residence for the academic year 1977–1978. My work would not have proceeded without the generous support of the Endowment, the congenial atmosphere at the Stanford Center and at Yale, and the gracious support of friends and colleagues among whom I would like especially to thank Carolyn Morillo, Suzanne Pharr, Don Hanks, and Tom Benson.
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