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The Imagery Debate
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Abstract
One central debate in cognitive science is over imagery. Do images constitute, or constitute evidence for, a distinctive, depictive form of mental representation? The most sophisticated advocacy of this view has been developed by Kosslyn and his coworkers. This paper focuses on his position and argues (i) that though Kosslyn has not developed a satisfactory account of depiction, there is nothing in principle unintelligible about the idea of depictive neural representation, but (ii) Kosslyn's model of imagery rescues the intelligibility of pictorialism at the cost of its explanatory power.
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- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1986
Footnotes
Thanks to David Armstrong, Ned Block, Michael Devitt, and Bill Lycan for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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