Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
An examination of the growing literature on gender and science leads to the conclusion that Richardson (1984) has underestimated the significance for philosophy of science of ideological critique. After describing one segment of this literature, namely, gender-based analyses of particular branches of scientific research, this paper argues that the function of at least gender ideological critique goes beyond explanation and that its explanatory function itself is broader than Richardson suggests. The paper also questions the thesis that the isolation of an ideological component in scientific research never in itself discredits that work. In so doing, it casts doubt on the adequacy of L. Laudan's taxonomy of scientific problems.
Completion of this work was made possible by a National Science Foundation Grant #SES-830509. Evelyn Fox Keller, Helen Longino, Michael Martin, and Patsy Schweickart provided helpful comments on an earlier draft, as did two referees for this journal.