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Hypothetical Pattern Idealization and Explanatory Models

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Yasha Rohwer  and
Collin Rice
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Abstract

Highly idealized models, such as the Hawk-Dove game, are pervasive in biological theorizing. We argue that the process and motivation that leads to the introduction of various idealizations into these models is not adequately captured by Michael Weisberg’s taxonomy of three kinds of idealization. Consequently, a fourth kind of idealization is required, which we call hypothetical pattern idealization. This kind of idealization is used to construct models that aim to be explanatory but do not aim to be explanations.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 80 , Issue 3 , July 2013 , pp. 334 - 355
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Both authors contributed equally to this work. We would like to thank Chris Pincock, André Ariew, Paul Weirich, Michael Weisberg, William Wimsatt, and several anonymous reviewers for comments and feedback on previous versions of this article. We would also like to thank the members of the University of Pittsburgh’s Center for the Philosophy of Science for helpful discussion, comments, and support. This research was partially supported by the Al and Mary Agnes McQuinn Chair in Entrepreneurial Leadership.

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