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How Natural Can Ontology Be?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Sharon L. Crasnow
Sharon L. Crasnow*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Riverside Community College
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, Riverside Community College, 2001 Third Street, Norco, CA 92860-2600; e-mail: [email protected].
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Abstract

Arthur Fine's Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) is intended to provide an alternative to both realism and antirealism. I argue that the most plausible meaning of “natural” in NOA is “nonphilosophical,” but that Fine comes to NOA through a particular conception of philosophy. I suggest that instead of a natural attitude we should adopt a philosophical attitude. This is one that is self-conscious, pragmatic, pluralistic, and sensitive to context. I conclude that when scientific realism and antirealism are viewed with a philosophical attitude there are still legitimate philosophical questions to address.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 67 , Issue 1 , March 2000 , pp. 114 - 132
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I particularly want to thank Eric Scerri for helpful comments on and conversations about earlier versions of this paper. In addition, I am grateful for the constructive remarks of the anonymous referees. Thanks also to Larry Laudan and the participants of his 1994 NEH Summer Seminar during which I began to develop these ideas.

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