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Horwich on ‘Semantic’ and ‘Metaphysical’ Realism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

David Davies
David Davies*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario
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Abstract

Horwich argues that we should reject metaphysical realism, but that we can preserve semantic realism by adhering to a redundancy theory of truth and a confirmationist account of linguistic understanding. But the latter will give us semantic realism only if it allows that the truth-values of sentences may transcend our recognitional capacities, and this is possible only insofar as we covertly reintroduce metaphysical realism. In spite of its intuitive appeal, we should not endorse semantic realism, but this need not bear upon the tenability of scientific realism.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 54 , Issue 4 , December 1987 , pp. 539 - 557
Copyright
Copyright © 1987 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I wish to thank Robert Butts, William Demopoulos, William Harper, Kathleen Okruhlik, and two anonymous referees for Philosophy of Science for most helpful discussions of these issues and criticisms of earlier incarnations of this paper.

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