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Holism, Historicism, and Emergence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Gustav Bergmann*
Affiliation:
The State University of Iowa

Extract

In a recent article P. Henle gave an analysis of the notion of emergence. His inquiry deals with what he calls, quite appropriately, the emergence of characteristics. Such emergence, that is, the emergence of qualities and relations is undoubtedly the primary connotation of the term, and I feel that Henle has been very successful in clarifying it. The purpose of the present paper is to discuss in some detail one special aspect of Henle's analysis. This is done because the precise formulation of this particular aspect sheds light on the notion of elementarism. And the opposite of this notion, holism or organicism, belongs undoubtedly to the variety of fused and confused meanings the idea of emergence has come to cover.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1944

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References

1 “The Status of Emergence,” J. of Phil., 1942, 39, 486–493.

2 In the quoted example novelty is actually denied to the logical predicate because it is an analytical consequence of other logical predicates which are not supposed to be novel. The logical or nondescriptive character of asymmetry is immediately appearent from the following definition in which only variables occur:

.

3 Wilhelm Wundt, Gustav Theodor Fechner, Rede zur Feier seines hundertsten Geburtstages. Leipzig, 1901.

4 Compare Mill's elaborate and sympathetic presentation of Comte's radical emergentism in The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, and the following passage from a letter about Comte he wrote to a French correspondent in 1854: “J'admets en général la partie logique de sa doctrine, ou en d'autres mots, tout ce qui se rapporte à la methode et à la philosophie de la science.” (Letters, I, p. 182) But see also, concerning Mill's independence, the remarks in the Autobiography which, however, do not exclude a direct influence on this particular point. One could also argue this way: The notion of mental chemistry in connection with a certain kind of novelty was introduced by Thomas Brown. One can safely assume that Mill was familiar with the work of Brown when he wrote the Logic; his great interest in psychology and his inclination to find analogical structures throughout the whole system of the sciences did the rest. Each of these two conjectures seems plausible to me and I do not have sufficient philological familiarity with the sources to venture an opinion as to which of them is more likely to be true.

5 Concerning the relation this point has to the theory of measurement, see also G. Bergmann and K. W. Spence, “The Logic of Psychophysical Measurement.” Psychol. Rev., 51, 1944, 1–24.

6 “Ueber Gestalttheorie.” See also the selection (p. 9) in W. D. Ellis, A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology.

7 K. Grelling and P. Oppenheim refer to a pattern as a W-Gestalt (Wertheimer), to a system of functional interdependence as a K-Gestalt (Koehler). See “Der Gestaltbegriff in Licht der neuen Logik.” Erkenntnis, 1938, 7, 211–224.

8 For an English account of these German ideas see M. H. Mandelbaum, The Problem of Historical Knowledge; concerning Hegelianism K. R. Popper, “What is Dialectics?.” Mind 49, 1940, 403–426; concerning Darwinism G. Bergmann, “Psychoanalysis and Experimental Psychology.” Mind, 52, 1943, 122–140.

9 Significantly the Gestalters are the only contemporary psychologists who hold this view.

10 The “principia media” about which K. Mannheim talks so much in Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction are just such laws.