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Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's Defense

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Karen Neander
Karen Neander*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Australian National University
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Abstract

In this paper I defend an etiological theory of biological functions (according to which the proper function of a trait is the effect for which it was selected by natural selection) against three objections which have been influential. I argue, contrary to Millikan, that it is wrong to base our defense of the theory on a rejection of conceptual analysis, for conceptual analysis does have an important role in philosophy of science. I also argue that biology requires a normative notion of a “proper function”, and that a normative notion is not ahistorical.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 58 , Issue 2 , June 1991 , pp. 168 - 184
Copyright
Copyright © 1991 The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I am grateful to many people for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, especially Paul Griffiths, William Lycan, Ruth Millikan, Robert Pargetter, Huw Price, Elliott Sober, and Kim Sterelny.

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