Article contents
Functionalism and the Meaning of Social Facts
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Abstract
This paper defends a social functionalist interpretation, modeled on psychological functionalism, of the meanings of social facts. Social functionalism provides a better explanation of the possibility of interpreting other cultures than approaches that identify the meanings of social facts with either mental states or behavior. I support this claim through a functionalist reinterpretation of sociological accounts of the categories that identify them with their collective representations. Taking the category of causality as my example, I show that if we define it instead in terms of its functional relations to moral rules, it becomes easier to recognize in other cultures.
- Type
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © 1999 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
I would like to thank those who attended the 1998 PSA session in which I delivered an earlier version of this paper, especially James Bohman, Douglas Jesseph, Mark Risjord, and Paul Roth, for their comments and suggestions.
References
- 3
- Cited by