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Functional Analysis and the Autonomy of Psychology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Uljana Feest
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Abstract

This paper examines the notion that psychology is autonomous. It is argued that we need to distinguish between (a) the question of whether psychological explanations are autonomous, and (b) the question of whether the process of psychological discovery is autonomous. The issue is approached by providing a reinterpretation of Robert Cummins's notion of functional analysis (FA). A distinction is drawn between FA as an explanatory strategy and FA as an investigative strategy. It is argued that the identification of functional components of the cognitive system may draw on knowledge about brain structure, without thereby jeopardizing the explanatory autonomy of psychology.

Type
Psychology, Cognitive, and Neuroscience
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 70 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2003 , pp. 937 - 948
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Many people have provided helpful comments on various previous drafts of this paper. In particular, the author would like to thank (in chronological order) Sandra Mitchell, John Roberts, Daniel Steel, Peter Machamer, Gualtiero Piccinini, and Paul Griffiths, as well as the participants of PSA session, “Psychology, Cognitive and Neuroscience.”

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