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A Functional Account of Causation; or, A Defense of the Legitimacy of Causal Thinking by Reference to the Only Standard That Matters—Usefulness (as Opposed to Metaphysics or Agreement with Intuitive Judgment)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

James Woodward
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Abstract

This essay advocates a “functional” approach to causation and causal reasoning: these are to be understood in terms of the goals and purposes of causal thinking. This approach is distinguished from accounts based on metaphysical considerations or on reconstruction of “intuitions.”

Type
Presidential Address
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 81 , Issue 5 , December 2014 , pp. 691 - 713
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

This article is based very largely on the text of my talk at the 2012 Philosophy of Science Meetings, with small modifications. It was written for oral presentation and intended to be provocative. Hence, many complications and qualifications that are usual in academic articles have been omitted. I’ve opted for preservation of the flavor of the original talk, rather than making any effort at precision.

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