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Four Philosophical Problems of Psycholinguists

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

George A. Miller
George A. Miller*
Affiliation:
The Rockefeller University
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Abstract

Four philosophical problems—predication, speech acts, rules, and innate ideas— are discussed in the light of their implications for psychological and linguistic research. The discussion of predication concerns both form and use. With respect to form, it is argued that our lexical memory is organized according to a predicate-argument formula that underlies the subject-predicate form of our sentences. With respect to use, it is argued that the illocutionary force of the sentence as a speech act must be taken into account. Both the formation and the use of such verbal constructions are normally characterized by systems of rules, but there is no clear account of what a rule is or how it might operate to control behavior, and this problem is especially difficult when, as in language, the person's knowledge of the rules is implicit. The innate basis for our human ability to acquire linguistic rules is considered and the problem of innateness is redefined around the conjecture that there are innate, language-specific mechanisms unique to human beings. The problem of investigating such language-specific mechanisms psychologically, however, is quite difficult at the present time.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 37 , Issue 2 , June 1970 , pp. 183 - 199
Copyright
Copyright © 1970 The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

The preparation of this manuscript was supported in part by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Grant No. DAHC15 68 G-5 to The Rockefeller University. It was first presented as a public lecture at the Educational Testing Service, Princeton, N.J., on October 14, 1968. I am indebted to Drs. T. G. Bever and Robert Nozick for valuable criticisms of an earlier draft.

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