Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
In this article I tackle the question of how the hierarchical order of mechanisms can be represented within a causal graph framework. I illustrate an answer to this question proposed by Casini, Illari, Russo, and Williamson and provide an example that their formalism does not support two important features of nested mechanisms: (i) a mechanism’s submechanisms are typically causally interacting with other parts of said mechanism, and (ii) intervening in some of a mechanism’s parts should have some influence on the phenomena the mechanism brings about. Finally, I sketch an alternative approach taking (i) and (ii) into account.
This work was supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), research unit Causation | Laws | Dispositions | Explanation (FOR 1063). My thanks go to Lorenzo Casini, Stuart Glennan, Jens Harbecke, Phyllis McKay Illari, Marie I. Kaiser, Gerhard Schurz, Paul Thorn, Matthias Unterhuber, Ioannis Votsis, and Jon Williamson for their input and important discussions. Thanks also to Christian J. Feldbacher, Sebastian Maaß, Alexander G. Mirnig, and Lucia M. Pichler as well as to two anonymous referees for constructive criticism on an earlier version of the article. An earlier version of this article won a best paper award at the 8th International Conference of the Association for Analytic Philosophy (GAP.8).