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Folk Psychology and Cognitive Architecture

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Frances Egan
Frances Egan*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy Rutgers University
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Abstract

It has recently been argued that the success of the connectionist program in cognitive science would threaten folk psychology. I articulate and defend a “minimalist” construal of folk psychology that comports well with empirical evidence on the folk understanding of belief and is compatible with even the most radical developments in cognitive science.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 62 , Issue 2 , June 1995 , pp. 179 - 196
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1995

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Footnotes

†

Thanks to William Bechtel, David Davies, Paul Lodge, Robert Matthews, Robert McCauley, and William Ramsey for helpful comments and criticism.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903, USA.

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