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Fine's “Shaky Game” (And Why Noa is no Ark for Science)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Richard H. Schlagel
Richard H. Schlagel*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The George Washington University
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Extract

The primary title of this essay is derived from Arthur Fine's recent book, The Shaky Game (1986), which is a rephrasing of “risky game”, a term Einstein applied to the defenders of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, claiming that “‘most of them simply do not see what sort of risky game they are playing with reality‘” (Fine 1986, 2). Just as Einstein's term indicates his disagreement with this standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, Fine's term is being used to express disapproval of his interpretation of the philosophy of physics of Einstein and Bohr. The subtitle forecasts my evaluation of Fine's attempt in NOA (the “Natural Ontological Attitude”) to provide a satisfactory ontological basis of scientific inquiry.

Type
Critical Notice
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 58 , Issue 2 , June 1991 , pp. 307 - 323
Copyright
Copyright © 1991 The Philosophy of Science Association

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