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Explanatory Relevance and Contrastive Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Christopher Pincock
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Abstract

A pluralist about explanation posits many explanatory relevance relations, while an invariantist denies any substantial role for context in fixing genuine explanation. This article summarizes one approach to combining pluralism and invariantism that emphasizes the contrastive nature of explanation. If explanations always take contrasts as their objects and contrasts come in types, then the role for the context in which an explanation is given can be minimized. This approach is illustrated using a classic debate between natural theology and natural selection about the structure of bees’ honeycombs.

Type
Explanation
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 85 , Issue 5 , December 2018 , pp. 806 - 818
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I am grateful to my cosymposiasts, Alisa Bokulich and Andrea Woody, for their contributions to the symposium and discussions of these issues. In addition, the audience for the symposium provided very helpful feedback that has hopefully led to a better version of this article. Finally, I would like to thank the anonymous referees and the editor for helping me to improve the article in several significant ways.

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