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Explanation Sketches

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Fred Newman
Fred Newman*
Affiliation:
City College of New York
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Abstract

According to Hempel, historians do not offer full-blown explanations. Rather, they typically present explanation-sketches which need filling out. On his account,

… Such a sketch consists of a more or less vague indication of the laws and initial conditions considered as relevant, and it needs ‘filling out’ in order to turn into a full fledged explanation. This filling out requires further empirical research for which the sketch suggests the direction …

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , April 1965 , pp. 168 - 172
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1965

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References

1 I benefited greatly from discussion with Professor Donald Davidson of Stanford University on these matters.

2 Carl Hempel, “The Function of General Laws in History,” Theories of History (Patrick Gardiner, editor; Glencoe, Illinois'. The Free Press, 1959), p. 351.

3 Michael Scriven, “Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanation,” Theories of History (Patrick Gardiner, editor; Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), p. 446.

4 Ibid., p. 448.

5 Ibid., p. 454.

6 Carl Hempel, “Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation,” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. III (Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell, editors; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), pp. 98-169

7 Maurice Mandelbaum, “Historical Explanation: The Problem of ‘Covering-Laws',’ History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History, 1: 229-242 (1961).

8 Ibid., p. 232.

9 It might be equally plausible to say that these formal systems exist with the well defined entailment relationship because of the intuitive obviousness of the truth of statements like “D 3 entails D 4“ and “D 5 entails D 6“ This, of course, smacks of Goodman's virtuous circle, see p. 67 of his Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.

10 The referee's comments have been most helpful in my rethinking and rewriting of this paper. However, on these particular points, viz. the criteria of equivalence of description and sameness of event described, he has been more than helpful. These are, in fact, his suggestions. I, of course, am responsible for them, as I have accepted and, perhaps minutely implemented them. However, I am greatly indebted to him for his help.