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Explanation in Classical Population Genetics
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
The recent literature in philosophy of biology has drawn attention to the different sorts of explanations proffered in the biological sciences—we have molecular, biomedical, and evolutionary explanations. Do these explanations all have a common structure or relation that they seek to capture? This paper will answer in the negative. I defend a pluralistic and pragmatic approach to explanation. Using examples from classical population genetics, I argue that formal demonstrations, and even strictly “mathematical truths,” may serve as explanatory in different historical contexts.
- Type
- The Making of the Genetical Theory of Evolution
- Information
- Philosophy of Science , Volume 71 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers , December 2004 , pp. 1201 - 1214
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2004 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
Thanks to my fellow symposiasts: Margaret Morrison, Sahotra Sarkar, and Rob Skipper for joining, and to John Beatty for chairing. Thanks also to Kyle Stanford for his questions and comments.
References
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