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Explanation and the Evolutionary First Law(s)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
Analogies between Newtonian mechanics and evolutionary processes are powerful but not infinitely versatile tools for generating explanations of particular biological phenomena. Their explanatory range is sensitive to a preliminary decision about which processes count as background conditions and which as special forces. Here I argue that the defenders of the zero-force evolutionary law are mistaken in defending their decision as the only appropriate one. The Hardy–Weinberg principle remains a viable option that is consistent with the epistemic role of Newton’s own first law, and the strengths and weaknesses of each analogy are sufficiently distinct to justify their continued coexistence.
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- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
I would like to thank Brandon Fogel, Kalie Kissoon, Trevor Pearce, Bob Richards, Beckett Sterner, Bill Sterner, Bill Wimsatt, and two anonymous reviewers for their help at various stages of this project.
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