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Error Probabilities in Error

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Colin Howson
Colin Howson*
Affiliation:
London School of Economics
*
†Department of Philosophy, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, England.
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Abstract

The Bayesian theory is outlined and its status as a logic defended. In this it is contrasted with the development and extension of Neyman-Pearson methodology by Mayo in her recently published book (1996). It is shown by means of a simple counterexample that the rule of inference advocated by Mayo is actually unsound. An explanation of why error-probablities lead us to believe that they supply a sound rule is offered, followed by a discussion of two apparently powerful objections to the Bayesian theory, one concerning old evidence and the other optional stopping.

Type
Symposium: Philosophy of Statistics and Epistemology of Experiment: Bayesian vs. Error Statistical Approaches
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 64 , Issue S4: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers Dec., 1997 , 1997 , pp. S185 - S194
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1997

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Footnotes

‡

Thanks are due to Lawrence Jackson, Milo Schield, and Peter Urbach for their help, and to the British Academy for financial assistance.

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