Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Recent philosophy of measurement has emphasized the existence of both diachronic and synchronic “loops,” or feedback processes, in the epistemic achievements of measurement. A widespread response has been to conclude that measurement outcomes do not convey interest-independent facts about the world and that only a coherentist epistemology of measurement is viable. In contrast, I argue that a form of measurement realism is consistent with these results. The insight is that antecedent structure in measuring spaces constrains our empirical procedures such that successful measurement conveys a limited but veridical knowledge of “fixed points,” or modally stable, interest-independent features of the world.
This article benefited from conversations with Teru Miyake, Eran Tal, George Smith, and J. E. Wolff, as well as the comments of participants at the PSA 2018 session on measurement.