Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dk4vv Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T00:50:36.075Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Empirical Psychology, Naturalized Epistemology, and First Philosophy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Harvey Siegel
Harvey Siegel*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Miami
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In his 1983 article, Paul A. Roth defends the Quinean project of naturalized epistemology from the criticism presented in my 1980 article. In this note I would like to respond to Roth's effort. I will argue that, while helpful in advancing and clarifying the issues, Roth's defense of naturalized epistemology does not succeed. The primary topic to be clarified is Quine's “no first philosophy” doctrine; but I will address myself to other points as well.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 51 , Issue 4 , December 1984 , pp. 667 - 676
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1984

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Davidson, D., and Hintikka, J. (eds.) (1969), Words and Objections. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.Google Scholar
Firth, R. (1981), “Epistemic Merit, Intrinsic and Instrumental”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 55: 5–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roth, P. (1980), “Theories of Nature and the Nature of Theories”, Mind 79: 431–38.Google Scholar
Roth, P. (1983), “Siegel on Naturalized Epistemology and Natural Science”, Philosophy of Science 50: 482–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Siegel, H. (1980), “Justification, Discovery and the Naturalizing of Epistemology”, Philosophy of Science 47: 297–321.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Siegel, H. (1983), “Reliabilism, Naturalism and Justification”, response presented at Pacific Division American Philosophical Association meeting, March 1983 (unpublished).Google Scholar