Article contents
Ecological Explanation between Manipulation and Mechanism Description
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
James Woodward offers a conception of explanation and mechanism in terms of interventionist counterfactuals. Based on a case from ecology, I show that ecologists’ approach to that case satisfies Woodward's conditions for explanation and mechanism, but his conception does not fully capture what ecologists view as explanatory. The new mechanistic philosophy likewise aims to describe central aspects of mechanisms, but I show that it is not sufficient to account for ecological mechanisms. I argue that in ecology explanation involves identification of invariant and insensitive causal relationships and descriptions of the mechanistic characteristics that make these relations possible.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
I am also affiliated with the Institute of Philosophy of the Romanian Academy, Str. 13 Septembrie nr. 13, Bucharest, Romania. I would like to thank Robert C. Richardson, Robert A. Skipper, Thomas Polger, Roberta Millstein, Lindley Darden, and the DC History and Philosophy of Biology Group, Clement Loo, and the session audience at the PSA meeting, 2008, for helpful suggestions and comments. Special thanks go to Aurelia Zbârnea for patience and support. Holly Groover's understanding was crucial for finishing the editing of this work. I am grateful to Diane Dunham and Bill Marvin for their help in improving the English of this article. I received financial support for this project from the Charles P. Taft Research Center at the University of Cincinnati and from the Research Council at the University of Dayton. This article is dedicated to the memory of Cezar Radu. În memoria marelui Cezar Radu.
References
- 11
- Cited by