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Dynamic Coherence and Probability Kinematics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Brian Skyrms
Brian Skyrms*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of California at Irvine
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Abstract

The question of coherence of rules for changing degrees of belief in the light of new evidence is studied, with special attention being given to cases in which evidence is uncertain. Belief change by the rule of conditionalization on an appropriate proposition and belief change by “probability kinematics“ on an appropriate partition are shown to have like status.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 54 , Issue 1 , March 1987 , pp. 1 - 20
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Research partially supported by National Science Foundation Grant SES-84-09898. Some of these results were presented at the Stanford University Statistics Colloquium in January, 1985, and to the Ohio State University Conference on Decision Theory in March, 1985. I would like to thank Ernest Adams, Brad Armendt, Nancy Cartwright, Persi Diaconis, Richard Jeffrey, Paul Teller, and Bas van Fraassen for comments on an earlier version of this paper.

References

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