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Does Quantum Mechanics Disprove the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

R. L. Barnette
R. L. Barnette*
Affiliation:
Valdosta State College
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Extract

Alberto Cortes, in [1], attempts to show (a) that Leibniz's Principle of The Identity of Indiscernibles (L) is a principle restricted to individuals (as distinct from a class of entities Cortes takes to be non-individuals), and (b) that photons (light quanta) appear to violate L (since they don't obey Pauli's Exclusion Principle). L is stated by Leibniz as “no two substances are completely similar, or differ solo numero.” In second-order quantification theory with identity L becomes:

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 45 , Issue 3 , September 1978 , pp. 466 - 470
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1978

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Footnotes

†

Special thanks go to an anonymous referee of this journal and to its editor, Kenneth Schaffner, for their helpful suggestions for improving the original version of this paper.

References

[1] Cortes, A. “Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles: A False Principle.” Philosophy of Science 43, (1976): 491–505.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[2] Van Fraassen, B. “Probabilities and the Problem of Individuation.” In Probabilities, Problems and Paradoxes, ed. by Luckenbach, S. A. Encino, California: Dickenson Publishing Co., 1972.Google Scholar