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Do Statistical Laws have Explanatory Efficacy?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Samuel E. Gluck
Samuel E. Gluck*
Affiliation:
Bonded Scale and Machine Co. Columbus, Ohio
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Extract

In “Studies In The Logic Of Explanation” (Philosophy of Science, XV, 1948) Hempel and Oppenheim analyze the basic pattern of scientific explanation. One of the difficult problems which they acknowledge is “whether and how the analysis of explanation can be extended from the case where all general explanatory principles invoked are of a strictly universal or ‘deterministic’ form to the case where explanatory reference is made to statistical hypotheses.” It is hoped that the remarks which follow may contribute a little toward clarifying the issue.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 22 , Issue 1 , January 1955 , pp. 34 - 38
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1955

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Footnotes

1

The author wishes to thank Professor Ernest Nagel for his instruction and encouragement, and Professor Hempel for his criticism of the manuscript as originally submitted.

References

2 As stated by Professor Hempel in a recent letter.

3 As Hempel and Oppenheim point out, their statement has many antecedents in Mill, Jevons, and others; and many current supporters. This concept of explanation is contrasted to that developed by Mach, Kirchhoff, Pearson, and von Mises, who see no fundamental difference between explanation and description.