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Do Quantum Objects Have Temporal Parts?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
This article provides a new context for an established metaphysical debate regarding the problem of persistence. I contend that perdurance, a popular view about persistence which maintains that objects persist by having temporal parts, can be formulated in quantum mechanics due to the existence of a formal analogy between temporal and spatial location. However, this analogy fails due to a ‘no-go’ result which demonstrates that quantum systems cannot be said to have temporal parts in the same way that they have spatial parts. Therefore, if quantum mechanics describes persisting physical objects then those objects cannot be said to perdure.
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- General Philosophy of Science
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- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
I would like to thank John Earman, John Norton, Jeremy Butterfield, Adam Caulton, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
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