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Discussion: The Failure to be Rational

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Morton L. Schagrin
Morton L. Schagrin*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy State University of New York at Fredonia
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Abstract

In a book and a series of articles (1977a, 1977b, 1977c, 1978) Harold I. Brown has presented “the new theory of science”, which he characterizes as a “modest historicism”. I propose to examine Brown's contribution to the current debate on scientific method, and to show the inadequacy of his proposals. In particular, I want to concentrate on a fundamental concern of Brown's, namely, rationality.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 49 , Issue 1 , March 1982 , pp. 120 - 124
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I am grateful for the criticisms and suggestions from my colleagues at Fredonia, H. I. Brown, J. Pitt, and the referees.

References

REFERENCES

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