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Discussion: The Contrast Theory of Why-Questions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Abstract
Classic studies of explanation, such as those of Hempel and Bromberger, took it for granted that an explanation-seeking question of the form “Why P?“ should be understood as asking about the proposition P. This view has been recently challenged by Bas van Fraassen and Alan Garfinkel. They acknowledge that some questions have the surface form “Why P?” but they hold that a correct reading for why-questions should take the form “Why P (rather than Q)?”, where Q is a contrasting alternative. This contrast theory is discussed here. It is argued that, properly understood, the contrast theory and the propositional approach can and should give equivalent readings to why-questions.
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- Copyright © 1988 by the Philosophy of Science Association
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I have at various times discussed these issues with Fred Gifford, Brendan Minogue, and Daniel Rothbart. I would like to thank them for their patience and helpfulness. I am also grateful to the anonymous referee who pointed out some weaknesses in earlier drafts of this paper, and to Larry Laudan who made a suggestion for improving the final draft.
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