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Discussion: Stich and Nisbett on Justifying Inference Rules

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Earl Conee  and
Richard Feldman
Richard Feldman
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of Rochester
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Abstract

Stich and Nisbett offer an analysis of the concept of a justified inference rule, building upon the efforts of Goodman. They fault Goodman's view on the grounds that it is incompatible with some recent psychological research on reasoning. We criticize their proposal by arguing that it is subject to much the same objections as those they raise against other accounts.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 50 , Issue 2 , June 1983 , pp. 326 - 331
Copyright
Copyright © 1983 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

Goodman, N. (1965), Fact, Fiction and Forecast. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill (second edition).Google Scholar
Stich, S., and Nisbett, R. (1980), “Justification and the Psychology of Human Reasoning”, Philosophy of Science 47: 188–202.CrossRefGoogle Scholar