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Discussion: On a Recent Objection to Popper and Miller's “Disproof” of Probabilistic Induction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Colin Howson
Colin Howson*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, The London School of Economics
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Abstract

Dunn and Hellman's objection to Popper and Miller's alleged disproof of inductive probability is considered and rejected. Dunn and Hellman base their objection on a decomposition of the incremental support P(h/e)-P(h) of h by e dual to that of Popper and Miller, and argue, dually to Popper and Miller, to a conclusion contrary to the latters' that all support is deductive in character. I contend that Dunn and Hellman's dualizing argument fails because the elements of their decomposition are not supports of parts of h. I conclude by reinforcing a different line of criticism of Popper and Miller due to Redhead.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 56 , Issue 4 , December 1989 , pp. 675 - 680
Copyright
Copyright © 1989 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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