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Discussion Note: Positive Relevance Defended

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Sherrilyn Roush†
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Abstract

This paper addresses two examples due to Peter Achinstein purporting to show that the positive relevance view of evidence is too strong, that is, that evidence need not raise the probability of what it is evidence for. The first example can work only if it makes a false assumption. The second example fails because what Achinstein claims is evidence is redundant with information we already have. Without these examples Achinstein is left without motivation for his account of evidence, which uses the concept of explanation in addition to that of probability.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 71 , Issue 1 , January 2004 , pp. 110 - 116
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Rice University and The Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, supported this work. I wish to thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion to draw a stronger conclusion about the second example.

References

Achinstein, Peter (1983), “Concepts of Evidence”, in Achinstein, Peter (ed.), The Concept of Evidence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 145–174.Google Scholar
Achinstein, Peter (1996), “Swimming in Evidence: A Reply to Maher”, Swimming in Evidence: A Reply to Maher 63:175–182.Google Scholar
Achinstein, Peter (2001), The Book of Evidence. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maher, Patrick (1996), “Subjective and Objective Confirmation”, Subjective and Objective Confirmation 63:149–174.Google Scholar