Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gbm5v Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T10:00:05.331Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Discussion: A Reply to Frankel's Criticism of Harré's Theory of Causality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Joseph Wayne Smith
Joseph Wayne Smith*
Affiliation:
Department of Sociology the Flinders University of South Australia
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Frankel (1976) has argued that the theory of causality developed by Rom Harré (Harré 1970) and his colleague Edward Madden (Harré and Madden 1975) is incoherent, since the proposal that causal claims are naturally necessary leads to a vicious infinite regression

“which ends by requiring that for any causal claim to be accorded the status of natural necessity an infinite number of causal claims must be accorded the status of natural necessities.” (Frankel 1976, p. 560)

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 49 , Issue 2 , June 1982 , pp. 282 - 289
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Bhaskar, R. (1978), A Realist Theory of Science. Sussex: Harvester Press.Google Scholar
Frankel, H. (1976), “Harré on Causation”, Philosophy of Science 43: 560–569.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harré, R. (1970), The Principles of Scientific Thinking. London: Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harré, R. and Madden, E. H. (1975), Causal Powers. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Madden, E. H. (1971), “Hume and the Fiery Furnace”, Philosophy of Science 38: 64–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Madden, E. H. and Cohen, B. (1973), “Harré and Nonlogical Necessity”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24: 176–182.Google Scholar
Miller, D. (1972), “Back to Aristotle?”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23: 69–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar