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A Defense of Longino's Social Epistemology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

K. Brad Wray
K. Brad Wray*
Affiliation:
University of Calgary
*
†Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary, 2500 University Drive NW, Calgary, Alberta, T2N 1N4.
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Abstract

Though many agree that we need to account for the role that social factors play in inquiry, developing a viable social epistemology has proved to be difficult. According to Longino, it is the processes that make inquiry possible that are aptly described as “social,” for they require a number of people to sustain them. These processes, she claims, not only facilitate inquiry, but also ensure that the results of inquiry are more than mere subjective opinions, and thus deserve to be called “knowledge.” In this paper, I (a) explain Longino's epistemology, and (b) defend it against charges that have recently been raised by Kitcher, Schmitt, and Solomon. Longino rightly recognizes that not all social factors have the same (adverse) affect on inquiry. She also recommends that we distinguish knowledge from mere opinion by reference to a social standard.

Type
Science and Values
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 66 , Issue S3: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers Sep., 1999 , 1999 , pp. S538 - S552
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

This paper benefitted from valuable feedback from numerous people. The following four deserve to be singled out: Lori Nash, Kathleen Okruhlik, Marc Ereshefsky, and Heidi Grasswick. In addition, numerous others gave me valuable feedback on earlier drafts, including: Alison Wylie, John Nicholas, Bruce Freed, Cheryl Misak, Marty Kreiswirth, Catherine Womack, Jay Odenbaugh, Mark Mercer, Charlie Martin, Bob Ware, and Richmond Campbell. I also benefitted from discussions at the following conferences at which I presented earlier drafts of the paper: the Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association, in Los Angeles in March 1998; the Canadian Philosophical Association's annual meeting, in Ottawa in May 1998; the World Congress of Philosophy, in Boston in August 1998; and the Philosophy of Science Association's Biennial meeting, in Kansas City in October 1998. The University of Calgary and the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Calgary provided financial support for me to pursue my research and attend the last of these conferences.

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