Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
In “Resurrecting Biological Essentialism,” I went against the consensus in the philosophy of biology by arguing that a Linnaean taxon, including a species, has an essence that is, at least partly, an underlying intrinsic, mostly genetic, property: this intrinsic nature explains both the truth of generalizations about the phenotypic properties of the taxon and why being in the taxon is explanatory. The current article is a response to two criticisms: that this intrinsic essentialism is at odds with certain biological variations and that this talk of intrinsic essences is an uncalled for metaphysical addition to biology.
I am grateful to the following people for helpful comments on drafts: Matthew Barker, John Dupré, Marc Ereshefsky, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Paul Griffiths, Joseph LaPorte, Antonella Mallozzi, Karen Neander, Makmiller Pedroso, Iakovos Vasiliou, Denis Walsh, and Andrea Woody.