Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-g7gxr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-19T04:32:30.040Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Defending Conventions as Functionally a Priori Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

David J. Stump
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Recent defenses of a priori knowledge can be applied to the idea of conventions in science in order to indicate one important sense in which conventionalism is correct—some elements of physical theory have a unique epistemological status as a functionally a priori part of our physical theory. I will argue that the former a priori should be treated as empirical in a very abstract sense, but still conventional. Though actually coming closer to the Quinean position than recent defenses of a priori knowledge, the picture of science developed here is very different from that developed in Quinean holism in that categories of knowledge can be differentiated.

Type
History of Philosophy of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 70 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2003 , pp. 1149 - 1160
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Coffa, J. Alberto (1991), The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cramér, H. (1946), Mathematical Methods of Statistics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Creath, Richard (1991), “Every Dogma Has Its Day”, Every Dogma Has Its Day 35:347–389.Google Scholar
De Pierris, Graciela (1992), “The Constitutive A Priori”, in Hanson, Philip and Hunter, Bruce (eds.), Return of the A Priori. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 179–214.Google Scholar
Enriques, Federigo (1906), Problemi di scienza. Bologna: Zanichelli.Google Scholar
Enriques, Federigo (1938), La théorie de la connaissance scientifique de Kant à nos jours. Paris: Hermann.Google Scholar
Forster, Malcolm, and Sober, Elliott (1994), “How to Tell when Simpler, More Unified, or Less ‘Ad Hoc’ Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions”, How to Tell when Simpler, More Unified, or Less ‘Ad Hoc’ Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions 45 (1): 1–35..Google Scholar
Friedman, Michael (1983), Foundations of Space-Time Theories: Relativistic Physics and Philosophy of Science. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Friedman, Michael (1994), “Geometry, Convention, and the Relativized A Priori”, in Salmon, Wesley and Wolters, Gereon (eds.), Logic, Language, and the Structure of Scientific Theories. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 21–34. Reprinted in Friedman 1999, 59–70.Google Scholar
Friedman, Michael (1997), “Helmholtz's Zeichentheorie and Schlick's Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre: Early Logical Empiricism and Its Nineteenth-Century Background”, Helmholtz's Zeichentheorie and Schlick's Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre: Early Logical Empiricism and Its Nineteenth-Century Background 25 (2): 19–50..Google Scholar
Friedman, Michael (1999), Reconsidering Logical Positivism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Friedman, Michael (2001), Dynamics of Reason. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.Google Scholar
Hacking, Ian (1992), “‘Style’ for Historians and Philosophers”, ‘Style’ for Historians and Philosophers 23:1–20.Google Scholar
Hanson, Philip, and Hunter, Bruce, (eds.) (1992), Return of the A Priori: Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 18. Calgary: University of Calgary Press.Google Scholar
Kuhn, Thomas S. ([1962] 1997), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Kuhn, Thomas S. (1990), “Dubbing and Redubbing: The Vulnerability of Rigid Designation”, Dubbing and Redubbing: The Vulnerability of Rigid Designation 14:298–318.Google Scholar
Lakatos, Imre ([1970] 1978), “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs”, in Worrall, J. and Currie, G. (eds.), Philosophical Papers: The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, Clarence Irving ([1941] 1970), “Logical Positivism and Pragmatism”, in Goheen, John D. and Mothershead, John L. Jr. (eds.), Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 92–112.Google Scholar
McCormmach, Russell (1967), “Henri Poincaré and the Quantum Theory”, Henri Poincaré and the Quantum Theory 58:37–55.Google Scholar
Neurath, Otto ([1929] 1974), “Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis”, in Neurath, Marie and Cohen, Robert S. (eds.), Empiricism and Sociology. Dordrecht: Reidel.Google Scholar
Nye, Mary Jo (1976), “The Nineteenth-Century Atomic Debates and the Dilemma of an ‘Indifferent Hypothesis’”, The Nineteenth-Century Atomic Debates and the Dilemma of an ‘Indifferent Hypothesis’ 7:245–268.Google Scholar
Pap, Arthur (1946), The A Priori in Physical Theory. New York: King's Crown Press.Google Scholar
Poincaré, Henri (1902), “Sur la valeur objective de la science”, Sur la valeur objective de la science 10:263–293.Google Scholar
Poincaré, Henri (1905), La valeur de la science. Paris: Flammarion, 1970.Google Scholar
Quine, Quine Willard Van ([1935] 1976), “Truth by Convention”, The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 77–106.Google Scholar
Quine, Quine Willard Van ([1953] 1980), “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 20–46.Google Scholar
Reichenbach, Hans (1958), Philosophy of Space and Time. New York: Dover.Google Scholar
Reichenbach, Hans (1965), The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Resnik, Michael D. (1997), Mathematics as a Science of Patterns. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Richardson, Alan (1997), “Two Dogmas about Logical Empiricism: Carnap and Quine on Logic, Epistemology, and Empiricism”, Two Dogmas about Logical Empiricism: Carnap and Quine on Logic, Epistemology, and Empiricism 25 (2): 145–168..Google Scholar
Schlick, Moritz ([1938] 1953), “Are Natural Laws Conventions?”, in Feigl, Herbert and Brodbeck, May (eds.), Readings in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 181–188.Google Scholar
Sklar, Lawrence (1974), Space, Time, and Spacetime. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Sklar, Lawrence (1986), Philosophy and Spacetime Physics. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Stein, Howard (1992), “Was Carnap Entirely Wrong, After All?”, Was Carnap Entirely Wrong, After All? 93:275–295.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1969), On Certainty. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar