Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-vdxz6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-29T17:09:48.890Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Decision Theory in Light of Newcomb's Problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Paul Horwich
Paul Horwich*
Affiliation:
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Should we act only for the sake of what we might bring about (causal decision theory); or is it enough for a decent motive that our action is highly correlated with something desirable (evidential decision theory)? The conflict between these points of view is embodied in Newcomb's problem. It is argued here that intuitive evidence from familiar decision contexts does not enable us to settle the issue, since the two theories dictate the same results in normal circumstances. Nevertheless, there are several reasons to reject the causal approach: (1) its relative complexity; (2) its commitment to the existence of situations in which every possible act would be irrational; (3) its incorporation of an arbitrary time bias; and (4) its implicit distinction between what ought to be done and what ought to be hoped for.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 52 , Issue 3 , September 1985 , pp. 431 - 450
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

†

I would like to thank Ned Block, Susan Brison, Josh Cohen, Allan Gibbard, Ellery Eells, Richard Jeffrey, David Lewis, Reed Richter, Brian Skyrms, Howard Sobel, and Bas van Fraassen for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

References

REFERENCES

Cartwright, N. (1979), “Causal Laws and Effective Strategies,” Noûs: 419–38. (Reprinted in How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.)Google Scholar
Eells, E. (1982), Rational Decision and Causality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gasking, D. (1955), “Causation and Recipes”, Mind 64: 474–87.Google Scholar
Gibbard, A., and Harper, W. L. (1978), “Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility” in Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, C. Hooker et al. (eds). Western Ontario Series in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 13. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Reprinted in Ifs, W. L. Harper et al. (eds). Western Ontario Series in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 15, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980.)Google Scholar
Healey, R. (1983), “Temporal and Causal Asymmetry”, in Space, Time and Causality, R. Swinburne (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Conferences, vol. 1981. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 79–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jeffrey, R. (1965), The Logic of Decision. New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
Jeffrey, R. (1981), “The Logic of Decision Defended”, Synthese 48: 473–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jeffrey, R. (1983), The Logic of Decision. 2nd edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Levi, I. (1975), “Newcomb's Many Problems,” Theory and Decision 6: 161–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. (1979a), “Prisoners' Dilemma Is a Newcomb Problem,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 8: 235–40.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. (1979b), “Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow,” Noûs 13: 455–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. (1981), “Causal Decision Theory”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59: 5–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mackie, J. L. (1974), Causation: The Cement of the Universe, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Nozick, R. (1969), “Newcomb's Problem and Two Principles of Choice”, in Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, Rescher, N. (ed.). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.Google Scholar
Reichenbach, H. (1956), The Direction of Time. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Richter, R. (1984), “Rationality Revisited”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62: 392–403. (Paper presented at the 1983 American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meetings.)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Savage, L. J. (1972), The Foundations of Statistics. 2nd revised edition. New York: Dover Publications Inc. (First edition, New York: Wiley, 1954).Google Scholar
Skyrms, B. (1980), Causal Necessity. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Sobel, J. H. (n.d.), “Probability, Chance and Choice”, unpublished manuscript.Google Scholar
Stalnaker, R. (1980), Letter to David Lewis, in Ifs, Harper, W. L. et al. (eds.). Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Letter written in 1972).Google Scholar
von Wright, G. H. (1971), Explanation and Understanding, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar