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Darwinism, Process Structuralism, and Natural Kinds

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Paul E. Griffiths
Paul E. Griffiths*
Affiliation:
University of Otago
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Abstract

Darwinists classify biological traits either by their ancestry (homology) or by their adaptive role. Only the latter can provide traditional natural kinds, but only the former is practicable. Process structuralists exploit this embarrassment to argue for non-Darwinian classifications in terms of underlying developmental mechanisms. This new taxonomy will also explain phylogenetic inertia and developmental constraint. I argue that Darwinian homologies are natural kinds despite having historical essences and being spatio-temporally restricted. Furthermore, process structuralist explanations of biological form require an unwarranted assumption about the space of developmental possibility.

Type
Philosophy of Biology
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue S3: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers Sep., 1996. , 1996 , pp. S1 - S9
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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Footnotes

†

Department of Philosophy, University of Otago, P.O. Box 56, Dunedin, New Zealand.

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