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Creativity in the Social Epistemology of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Mike D. Schneider
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Abstract

Adrian Currie has introduced a novel account of creativity within the social epistemology of science. The account is intended to capture how conservatism can be detrimental to the health of inquiry within certain scientific communities, given the aims of research there. I argue that recent remarks by Carlo Rovelli put pressure on the applicability of the account. Altogether, it seems we do not yet well understand the relationship between creativity, conservatism, and the health of inquiry in science.

Type
Social Epistemology and Science Policy
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 88 , Issue 5 , December 2021 , pp. 882 - 893
Copyright
Copyright 2021 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank Kino Zhao and Kyle Stanford for their helpful conversations and comments in the planning of this article, as well as Jim Weatherall, Kyle Stanford (again), and Adrian Currie for their input in my revising it.

References

Currie, A. 2019. “Existential Risk, Creativity and Well-Adapted Science.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A 76:39–48.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
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