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Counterfactual Reasoning in the Bell-EPR Paradox
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Abstract
Skyrms's formulation of the argument against stochastic hidden variables in quantum mechanics using conditionals with chance consequences suffers from an ambiguity in its “conservation“ assumption. The strong version, which Skyrms needs, packs in a “no-rapport” assumption in addition to the weaker statement of the “experimental facts.“ On the positive side, I argue that Skyrms's proof has two unnoted virtues (not shared by previous proofs): (1) it shows that certain difficulties that arise for deterministic hidden variable theories that exploit a non-classical probability theory extend to the stochastic case; (2) the use of counterfactual conditionals relates the Bell puzzle to Dummett's (1976) discussion of realism in quantum mechanics.
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- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1986
Footnotes
Thanks go to the participants of the May 1984 Workshop on Quantum Logic held at the University of Western Ontario who commented on an earlier version of this paper, especially Professors J. Bub, W. Demopoulos, W. Harper, C. Hooker, and I. Pitowsky. I also benefited greatly from correspondence with Professor B. Skyrms, as well as from comments of two referees.
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